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Abstract: This article explores parallels between the ‘shunning’ and ‘seeking’ of 
membership of the EU in the context of Brexit and stalled enlargement in south east 
Europe, via a focus on the partial, fragmentary and contested governance of citizenship. 
The case studies place Union citizenship into a wider political and socio-economic 
context, demonstrating its central importance as an enabler of personal freedom. At the 
same time, they highlight how the denial or removal of Union citizenship can engender 
individual strategies to recover lost or denied benefits. From the analysis, parallels 
emerge between Union citizenship and national citizenship; both offer a promise of 
equality, but a reality of differentiation and inequality. At the same time, by delving 
deep into the case studies, it proves possible to illuminate the complex and often 
‘messy’ constitutional edifice of the European Union, involving sometimes 
contradictory processes of Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation affecting citizenship 
regimes at all levels. 
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I Introduction: the shunners and the seekers of European constitutional 
order 
 
Since the 1950s, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a semi-constitutionalised 
non-state polity with institutions endowed with legislative powers and an independent 
Court of Justice (CJEU), mandating the sharing of some areas of sovereignty amongst 
its Member States.1 In terms of both its economic and its civilian power, it casts an 
extensive shadow over the states in its neighbourhood, both those that seek membership 
and those that, for various reasons, shun it.2 
 
In the north west corner of Europe, after many years of internal political strife relating 
to its EU membership, the United Kingdom decided to hold an in/out referendum. This 
decision reflected years of contested EU policy within the Conservative Party (between 
pro- and anti-European wings) and the dramatic rise of the populist anti-EU UK 
Independence Party (UKIP). In June 2016, after a problematic campaign in which 
‘immigration’ (which also encompassed EU free movement) became an increasingly 
salient policy issue, the electorate of the UK decided, by a margin of 52% to 48%, that 
the UK should leave the EU (i.e. ‘Brexit’). 
 
This has launched a process that may take a decade or more to complete and which will 
be likely to have effects that are felt for many decades to come, certainly by those 
persons directly implicated by the decision (i.e. mobile UK and EU27 citizens plus their 
families) and quite probably in respect of the development of the economy and the 
society as a whole.3 Many fear that the effects of Brexit will be negative in terms of 
both economic growth and social cohesion. The process has both formal and informal 
dimensions of adjustment. While Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) 
is the legal basis for any withdrawal agreement, any future agreement between the EU 
(and its Member States) will need to be concluded on the basis of the EU Treaty 
provisions on relations with third countries. The impact of Brexit will extend well 
beyond legal formalities. All Member States and their citizens will inevitably be 
affected by the reduction in the size of the EU, the removal of a major economy from 
the single market and the EU budget, the departure of an important power from the 
negotiating table, and the symbolic impact on the idea of integration brought about by a 
contraction of territory and numbers of citizens.4 
 
In the south east corner of Europe, after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the 1990s, seven new states eventually emerged where once 
there was one, each with its own national citizenship regime. First came Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzogovina, Macedonia5 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
                                                 
1  See most recently, in the context of the interpretation of Article 50 TEU, Case C-621/18 
Wightman and others v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999. 
2  T Börzel, ‘European Governance – Negotiation and Competition in the Shadow of Hierarchy’, 
(2010) 48 Journal of Common Market Studies 191-219.  
3  J Shaw, ‘Citizenship and free movement in a changing EU: Navigating an archipelago of 
contradictions’, in B Martill and U Staiger (eds.), Brexit and beyond: Rethinking the future of 
Europe (UCL Press, London, 2018) 260-265. 
4  U Staiger and B Martill, ‘Rethinking the futures of Europe’, in Martill and Staiger, above n3. 
5  At the insistence of Greece because of concerns around its own region of Macedonia, on 
independence the country was formally known as the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of 
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(FRY) from 1992, with Montenegro and Serbia eventually emerging in 2006 as separate 
states from FRY / the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, with Montenegro’s 
expressed wish to be independent. Finally, Kosovo gained independence in 2008. To 
give an example of the impact of multiple changes at the state level, a citizen of Serbia 
or Montenegro born before 1991, who never left their hometown, will have been in their 
lifetime a citizen of four different states, even without taking any possible dual 
citizenships (e.g. by descent) into account. 
 
The 1990s saw major conflict and violence in the region, for complex reasons that 
included ethnic tensions and the role of political elites with expansionist ambitions. 
Several of the new states remain weak and unconsolidated both internally and 
externally, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, what is now North Macedonia and 
Kosovo. Democratic backsliding and corruption are problems in many of the states. 
Despite general political will on all sides pointing strongly in the direction of a 
European future, the prospects that all these new states could become Member States of 
the European Union within a few years are low.6 Since the accession of Slovenia in 
2004 and Croatia in 2013 under Article 49 TEU, the enlargement process has stalled, 
leaving the other five new states, plus neighbouring Albania, and their citizens, ‘out in 
the cold’. This is the region that the EU terms the ‘Western Balkans’. All of its land 
borders abut EU Member States. 
 
At first sight, there seems little that these two cases of shunning and seeking the 
membership of a supranational organisation have in common. The main aim of this 
article is to push back against this assumption, and to identify what type of analytical 
framework, drawing mainly on legal, political and constitutional scholarship, is useful 
for engaging in a comparison of similarities and differences. As to the purpose of the 
‘push back’, the argument is developed that this juxtaposition of two ostensibly 
contrasting ‘European stories’7 can illuminate some of the most important dynamics of 
the complex and differentiated ‘euro-polity’, with its multilevel and incomplete 
constitutional framework, and can help us reconsider questions about what it means to 
be ‘European’. As to the framework for the comparison, this draws upon a critique of 
how Europeanisation, de-Europeanisation and indeed re-Europeanisation play out 
within the EU’s constitutional framework using a case study of EU-level and national 
citizenship regimes viewed from the perspective of Brexit and stalled enlargement. 
 
II The consequences of Brexit and stalled enlargement in a messy 
constitutional order 
 
Both internally, and in its relationships with ‘the outside’ and ‘outsiders’, the European 
Union operates with a messy multi-layered constitutional structure and more complex 
sets of relationships than is often appreciated by those whose classic starting point is the 
uniformity and supremacy of EU law vis-à-vis national law and a binary notion that a 
                                                 
Macedonia’. The country has recently altered its name after the Prespo agreement with Greece 
and is now called Northern Macedonia. 
6  For a review of EU’s relations with the Western Balkans see T Vogel, Out of Focus: the EU’s 
Relations with the Western Balkans, Blog, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 9 October 2018, available 
at <https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/10/09/out-focus-eus-relations-western-balkans>. 
7  J Lacroix and K Nicolaïdis (eds), European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National 
Contexts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). 
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given state is either inside, or outside, the EU.8 Analysis of the euro-polity through the 
prism of these two peripheries, in relation to the manner in which they engage with ‘the 
mainstream’, raises questions not only about the constitutional framework of the Union 
itself and those of the Member States, but also about those of the states shunning and 
seeking membership (however successful or unsuccessful they are in their respective 
strategies). It tells an important story about Europeanisation, de-Europeanisation and 
potential re-Europeanisation, concepts that should be understood in a broad socio-
cultural sense that encompasses not only the enforceable legal obligations of EU 
membership, but also other issues of ‘fit’ (or lack of it) between the EU, national and 
subnational levels of governance as well as broader societal dynamics. 
 
There are many common elements and areas of symmetry between the two cases, 
although they involve differing starting points and processes of change, not to mention 
contrasting political, social and economic circumstances. Catherine Baker argues that 
‘the UK and Yugoslavia represent two comparable multinational states with severe 
regional inequalities, and unresolved histories of state and non-state political violence.’9 
Federal Yugoslavia disintegrated, pushing most of its constituent states from the front of 
the ‘queue’ for integration with the then European Communities, where it sat until 1991 
with a unique Cooperation Agreement and serious prospects of an Association 
Agreement,10 to the back. Brexit, meanwhile, is placing intense pressure upon internal 
boundaries and territorial governance within the UK,11 especially as regards the status 
of Northern Ireland and (perhaps less urgently, but none the less significantly) Scotland. 
It has been argued that Brexit could precipitate the break-up of the Union.12 
Furthermore, the processes themselves are less sharp or simple than they appear at first 
sight, and the outcomes less clear. The UK wishes to leave the EU, although close 
observers will have spotted that leaving is complicated and any departure may not result 
in the sharp break that many Leave campaigners have argued for enthusiastically since 
the vote.13 The new states of south east Europe and Albania wish to accede to the EU, 
but are held at bay for a combination of political and economic reasons, many of which 
are outside their (citizens’ and governments’) control, and relate to a reassertion of 
control in the context of enlargement policies by the existing Member States.14 In sum, 
                                                 
8  It should be noted that this binary division, and the importance of national sovereignty in this 
context, dominates the CJEU’s judgment in Wightman, see n1. 
9  C Baker, Race and the Yugoslav Region (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2018) 183. 
Others have argued for parallels between the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the crisis of 
integration that the EU faces more generally: J Becker, ‘In the Yugoslav Mirror: The EU 
Disintegration Crisis’, (2017) 14 Globalizations 840-850. 
10  B Zaccaria, The EEC’s Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968-1980 (Palgrave, London, 
2016); I Obadic, A troubled relationship: Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community in 
détente’, (2014) 21 European Review of History: Revue europeenne d’histoire 329-348. 
11  T Mullen, ‘Brexit and the territorial governance of the United Kingdom’, (2019) Contemporary 
Social Science, DOI: 10.1080/21582041.2018.1563802. 
12  D Wincott, ‘Brexit and the State of the United Kingdom’, in P Diamond, P Nedergaard and B 
Rosamond (eds), The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Brexit (Routledge, London, 2018) 
15-26; B Jessop, ‘The Organic Crisis of the British State: Putting Brexit in its Place’, (2017) 14 
Globalizations 133-141. 
13  A Gamble, ‘Taking back control: the political implications of Brexit’, (2018) 25 Journal of 
European Public Policy 1215-1232. 
14  C Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy, SIEPS Report 2010. 
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Brexit and stalled enlargement could both be dubbed cases of ‘troubled (non-
)membership’ (adapting a term coined by Carlos Closa15). 
 
This is a broad and potentially open-ended topic, so this article narrows the focus by 
exploring the parallels between the two cases of Brexit and (stalled) enlargement in one 
specific area: that of citizenship. Assessing similar questions in relation to what they 
term the ‘territorial rescaling’ of citizenship, Jean-Thomas Arrighi and Dejan 
Stjepanović point out that ‘the problem is thus not so much that borders migrate, but 
that they do so over people.’16 These impacts demand close study. 
 
With its legal, political and identitarian dimensions,17 the transformation of citizenship 
in the European constitutional space offers an ideal test case through which to explore 
the processes of integration and disintegration which are occurring across the north 
western and south eastern borders of the EU. So many different aspects of collective 
and individual life are touched by citizenship. 
 
The focus is on both Union citizenship at the supranational level and the national 
citizenship regimes of Member States and putative and departing Member States, as 
well as on the relationship between the ‘levels’. The idea of a common Union 
citizenship, attaching solely to those who are the nationals of the Member States and 
drawing strength from related international sources of law such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention on Nationality, is arguably 
one of the core constitutional pillars of the European Union. Like the Union itself, 
though, Union citizenship is messy, incomplete and contested, especially as regards its 
impacts on domestic citizenship regimes. Union citizenship is said, by the European 
Court of Justice, to be ‘destined to be the fundamental status of the nationals of the 
Member States’,18 but in many respects this statement seems to be judicial flourish and 
jurisprudential innovation, rather than rigorous textual interpretation of the treaties, 
related legal sources and prior case law.19 What is important is that ‘citizenship’ (and 
citizenship regimes), especially when explored through conceptual rather than just legal 
lenses, can have symbolic and ideational value extending well beyond the institutional 
apparatus.20 
 
At both the practical and the ideational levels, Brexit and (stalled) enlargement impact 
in important ways upon the partial, fragmentary and contested multi-level governance 
of citizenship in Europe: as a result of geo-political changes/non-changes in the 
dimensions of the EU (the fraught process of Brexit and what is, for now, a stalled 
enlargement process in south east Europe), certain groups of national citizens may 
remain, or become, or cease to be, or never become Union citizens; or they may lose or 
                                                 
15  C Closa (ed), Secession from a Member State and Withdrawal from the European Union 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018). 
16  J-T Arrighi and D Stjepanović, ‘Introduction: The Rescaling of Territory and Citizenship in 
Europe, (2019) 18 Ethnopolitics DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2019.1585087 at 3. 
17  A Wiener, ‘Making Sense of the New Geography of Citizenship: Fragmented Citizenship in the 
European Union’ (1997) 26 Theory and Society 529-60. 
18  Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para 31. 
19  F Strumia, ‘European Citizenship and Transnational Rights: Chronicles of a Troubled 
Narrative’, in D Thym (ed), Questioning EU Citizenship: judges and the Limits of Free 
Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Hart, Oxford, 2017) 149-167. 
20  C Wiesner et al ‘Introduction: Shaping citizenship as a political concept’, in C Wiesner et al 
(eds) Shaping Citizenship (Routledge, New York, 2018) 1-16.  
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gain the rights and privileges of Union citizenship through residence in another state, 
which becomes or ceases to be an EU Member State. Conversely, they may become, or 
remain, third country nationals subject to a body of laws stemming partly from the EU 
and partly from the Member States, in this area of shared competence. As to their status 
as national citizens of one or more states, this is thrown into high relief by the pressures 
on rights holding and rights exercising that Brexit and stalled enlargement give rise. 
Since neither case to be examined evinces a smooth pathway to exit/entry, this 
intensifies pressures on the citizenship regimes of all the states involved (including the 
remaining Member States) across areas of domestic policy that are not those most 
obviously influenced by EU law, including the norms governing the acquisition and loss 
of citizenship and consequent ‘citizenship practices’ of affected individuals and groups. 
In the case of Brexit, levels of anxiety about possible outcomes including ‘no deal’ are 
high.21 In the case of south east Europe, citizens are left more isolated because they do 
not enjoy the benefits of Union citizenship, and disillusionment with political 
authorities both domestically and in the EU is high.22 
 
The two cases are different, of course, because in one Union citizenship has not so far 
been conferred on the national citizens and indeed may never be (i.e., stalled 
enlargement), but in the other it seems most likely to be removed having once been in 
place (i.e., withdrawal from the EU). But that identifies another parallel between the 
two cases. The process and direction of travel are different, but the outcomes could end 
up being the same. Both citizenries would be on the outside, as would both territories, 
which likewise would mean that those who retain Union citizenship (i.e., the citizens of 
the EU27) would not benefit from this status when in those countries. They themselves 
would be third country nationals in respect of those newly, or still, third countries. 
 
The next section of the article will link these preliminary descriptive observations about 
the ‘citizenship consequences’ of Brexit and stalled enlargement to a wider framework 
encompassing the complex and messy multi-level framework of the Euro-polity 
(Section III). Section IV explores the analytical possibilities of combining a focus on 
rethinking citizenship with a focus on the concepts and practices of de/Europeanisation 
in the context of regional dis/integration, highlighting the differential impacts of legal 
and institutional changes as well as the broader symbolic questions about ‘who 
belongs’. This framing produces a range of tools for assessing the impacts of change 
and no change in relation to withdrawal from or accession to the European Union, 
which can be applied when studying Brexit (Section V) and (stalled) enlargement 
(Section VI). These sections will show, in practice, how citizenship governance is both 
contested and fragmented within the European constitutional space, where we can see a 
Europe of not one, but many citizenships. Section VII provides a brief conclusion by 
linking the case studies of citizenship governance back to the broader questions of 
constitutionalism and constitutionalisation in the euro-polity. 
 
III Citizenship governance in Europe’s contested constitutional space 
 
                                                 
21  T Guma and R Dafydd Jones, ‘“Where are we going to go now?” European Union migrants’ 
experiences of hostility, anxiety, and (non‐)belonging during Brexit’ (2019) 25 Population, 
Space and Place, DOI: 10.1002/psp.2198. 
22  R Belloni, ‘The European Union Blowback? Euroscepticism and its Consequences in the 
Western Balkans’, (2016) 10 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 530-547. 
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While the power to set the rules on acquisition and loss of citizenship is prima facie a 
matter of national sovereign prerogative, this does not mean that these rules are not 
influenced by factors such as migration flows, the measures taken by other countries 
and the activities of supranational and international organisations. For some decades, 
multiple sites of citizenship governance within Europe have laid claim to authority and 
legitimacy in relation to the allocation of citizenship rights and, to a rather lesser extent, 
the allegiance of citizens, at the subnational, national, supranational and international 
levels.23 This process of normative fragmentation continues as the EU develops further 
and as restive subnational units, e.g. in Spain and the UK, request and exercise 
additional powers which determine many of the substantive rights of citizenship, if not 
the actual scope of national citizenship. It extends across all the interrelated domains of 
citizenship as a membership status, including the civic, private, political, economic, 
social and cultural/identitarian domains. 
 
In the sphere of citizenship, regional integration EU-style began with legally 
enforceable but not unconditional freedom of movement for persons, buttressed by 
principles of mutual recognition, guarantees of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, and legislative measures taken to ensure a level playing field within a single 
market. The conditions and limits relate to a broad range of matters including public 
health, security and policy, employment in some parts of the public service, and some 
(more limited) options for protecting areas of national sovereignty such as culture, 
language and the welfare state.24 This complex network of provisions is underpinned by 
the role given to the CJEU to interpret and apply EU law, especially in response to 
references made by national courts seeking to clarify uncertainties. Taken as a whole, 
the measures relating to the free movement of persons on their own already have the 
potential to alter the boundaries of membership for individuals, by granting new rights 
whilst placing new restrictions on Member States by reference to market norms, leading 
to a dramatic rescaling of citizenship rights and practices. 
 
A further step was taken with the formal recognition of a concept of ‘citizenship of the 
Union’ in the EU’s formative Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. Measures relating to 
‘citizenship’ are now to be found in the TEU, in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and in other legal instruments such as Directive 2004/38, the 
so-called Citizens’ Rights Directive.25 There is also a considerable – and not always 
entirely clear or consistent – body of case law from the CJEU.26 The existence of Union 
citizenship makes it clear that the UK is leaving, and the Western Balkan states are 
seeking to join, a constitutionalised political edifice which is more than simply a 
framework for (socio-)economic cooperation, even though the precise character of that 
‘citizenship figure’ is not clear.27 Union citizenship brings the free moving EU citizen to 
                                                 
23  R Bauböck, ‘Citizenship and Collective Identities as Political Sources of Solidarity in the 
European Union’, in K Banting and W Kymlicka, (eds), The strains of commitment: The 
political sources of solidarity in diverse societies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017), 80-
106. 
24  P Koutrakos, N Nic Shuibhne and P Syrpis (eds), Exceptions from EU Free Movement Law: 
Derogation, Justification and Proportionality (Hart, Oxford, 2016). 
25  Directive 2004/38/EC, ECLI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/38/oj. 
26  See the contributions to Thym, above n19. Compare, for a different view, the President of the 
CJEU, writing extra-judicially: K Lenaerts, ‘EU citizenship and the European Court of Justice’s 
“stone-by-stone” approach’, (2015) 1 International Comparative Jurisprudence 1-10. 
27  E Olsen (2013) ‘European Citizenship: Mixing Nation State and Federal Features with a 
Cosmopolitan Twist’, (2013) 14 Perspectives on European Politics and Society 505-519. 
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the forefront of the EU’s constitutional concerns, but those same legal structures make 
access to Union citizenship dependent upon being a national of a Member State. In that 
sense, Union citizenship continues to be derivative from an exercise of national 
sovereignty, which determines who are the national citizens.28 A modest framework of 
additional rights focused on free moving citizens has been grafted around the concept of 
Union citizenship, such as the right to vote in European Parliament and local elections 
on the basis of residence, and rights to consular protection when in third countries. They 
buttress the notion that the free moving Union citizen should be seen from the 
perspective of Member State laws as a ‘second country’ rather than ‘third country’ 
national. At the same time, the EU treaties also seem to offer little direct benefit to those 
citizens who do not exercise free movement rights, beyond what many see as the 
dubious privilege of being able to vote in European Parliament elections as an 
additional layer of democratic engagement beyond the state.29 This creates a scenario in 
which ‘static’ citizens could easily see themselves as victims, not beneficiaries, of the 
integration process and as second class Union citizens. Even though Union citizenship 
is additive (and indeed generally popular amongst the nationals of the Member States), 
it is not uniformly seen as positive across all sectors of society, or in all Member 
States.30 The political and identitarian dimensions of Union citizenship remain relatively 
weak, and given the limited role of the EU in relation to matters of redistribution (e.g., 
through taxation), its capacity to foster social cohesion is similarly limited. 
 
At the same time as opening up internal borders, free movement has also been paired 
with a closure of the outer boundaries of the EU. These are the policies of so-called 
Fortress Europe, encompassing migration, asylum and border policies shared between 
the Member States and the EU which close off South-North and East-West migration 
from beyond the boundaries of the EU, turn the Mediterranean Sea into a graveyard and 
place what some Member States see as unwarranted burdens upon them, because of the 
inadequacies of burden-sharing processes in relation to refugee arrival and reception.31 
Much of this is done in the name of protecting both national cultures and the viability of 
the national welfare state.32 
 
Citizenship governance has become increasingly contested across the European political 
space. By the end of the 2010s, fraught centre-periphery dynamics regarding the 
trajectory of integration had become entrenched, not least in the wake of the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements which led to an increased rate of labour mobility across the EU.33 
South North migration also increased in the wake of the financial crisis at the end of the 
                                                 
28  L Orgad and J Lepoutre, Should EU citizenship be disentangled from member state nationality?, 
EUI Working Paper, 2019/24. 
29  The right to vote in European Parliament elections was confirmed by the CJEU in Case C-
650/13 Delvigne ECLI:EU:C:2015:648. 
30  See S Vasilopoulou & L Talving, ‘Opportunity or threat? Public attitudes towards EU freedom 
of movement’, (2019) 26 Journal of European Public Policy 805-823. 
31  W Outhwaite, ‘Migration Crisis and “Brexit”’, in C Menjívar et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Migration Crises (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019), A Favell, ‘Brexit: a requiem for 
the post-national society?’, (2019) 9 Global Discourse, DOI: 
10.1332/204378918X15453934506021. 
32  C Cantat and P Rajaram, ‘The Politics of Refugee Crisis in Hungary: B/ordering the Nation and 
Its Others’, in Menjívar et al above n31. 
33  B Glorius et al (eds) Mobility in Transition: Migration Patterns after EU Enlargement 
(Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2013), JSTOR, <www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46mwhx>; 
M Kahanec and M Pytliková, ‘The economic impact of east-west migration on the European 
Union’, (2017) 44 Empirica 407-433. 
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2000s and of the recessions to which it gave rise.34 These dynamics have contributed to 
challenging certain assumptions about ‘ever closer union’ that earlier came to dominate 
much public discourse around the EU. Levels of contestation over processes of regional 
integration have generally remained highest at Europe’s geographical edges. They have 
impacted upon the calculus of the socio-economic benefits of membership and on 
identity questions about ‘who we are’. The value of free movement has been put in 
question,35 at the same time as Union citizenship’s apparent ‘lack of duties’ has been 
raised as a problem.36 
 
The same normative fragmentation that has offered the personal and market freedoms of 
free movement and mutual recognition,37 with Union citizenship operating also as a 
symbol for an emerging European political and constitutional space,38 has come to be 
contested across a number of dimensions.39 For example, questions have been raised 
about duties and relationships of solidarity, which take different forms across the 
multilevel framework of citizenship governance.40 Some fear that the EU principles of 
non-discrimination between states and citizens undermine equality within states, in 
relation to ‘their’ citizens. Union citizenship is designed to be additional to and not to 
replace national citizenship. This may be true at the individual level. However, at the 
collective level, Union citizenship arguably has the effect of hollowing out national 
citizenship regimes by creating new sites of privilege and disadvantage, which distort 
the domestic settlement or social contract.41 An explicitly nationalist line holds that EU 
membership ‘necessarily weakens national citizenship, because it limits the democratic 
choices member states can make and prevents national governments from prioritising 
the welfare of their own citizens’.42 The same line of argument can be used to justify 
restricting the scope of Union citizenship by rejecting future enlargements on the 
grounds that it creates too much potential for intra-EU mobility. A claim around the 
immigration risks of the putative accession of Turkey to the EU was used in the Brexit 
referendum, even though such an enlargement is unlikely to happen even in the medium 
term.43 But when it comes to assessing such claims, it may sometimes be hard to 
determine where the line lies between policies to support the legitimate national 
foundations of the social contract, on the one hand, and welfare chauvinism, on the 
other. This has evident implications not just for the Brexit calculus by voters, but also 
                                                 
34  JM Lafleur and M Stanek (eds), South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis 
(Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2017). 
35  ‘Freedom of Movement under Attack: Is it worth defending as the core of EU citizenship?’, Part 
II of R Bauböck (ed), Debating European Citizenship (Springer International Publishing, Cham, 
2019). 
36  ‘Should EU Citizenship be Duty-Free?’, Part III of Bauböck above n35. 
37  K Nicolaïdes, ‘Mutual Recognition: Promise and Denial, from Sapiens to Brexit’, (2017) 70 
Current Legal Problems 1-40. 
38  J Shaw ‘Citizenship: contrasting dynamics at the interface of integration and constitutionalism’, 
in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011) 575-609; J Shaw, ‘EU citizenship: still a fundamental status?’, in Bauböck above 
n35 1-17. 
39  Vasiloupoulou and Talving above n30. 
40  Bauböck, above n23; R Bellamy and J Lacey, ‘Balancing the rights and duties of European and 
national citizens: A demoicratic approach’, (2018) 25 Journal of European Public Policy 1403-
1421. 
41  Bellamy and Lacey, above n40. 
42  A tweet by former special advisor to Prime Minister Theresa May, Nick Timothy published on 
Twitter, 2 March 2018 (on file with author as screenshot). 
43  J Ker-Lindsay, ‘Turkey’s EU accession as a factor in the 2016 Brexit referendum’, (2018) 19 
Turkish Studies 1-22. 
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for the waning possibilities of EU accession for countries seen as potential sources of 
such problematic ‘free movement’ if they are brought into the circle (and not just by the 
UK). The risks to welfare states are part of the panoply of arguments used – sometimes 
implicitly rather than explicitly – to deny speedy enlargement in South East Europe.44 
 
In sum, what has emerged from the EU’s engagement with citizenship across many 
years is a situation in which the concept itself has been internally and externally 
contested, and where it is clearly ripe for manipulation by those who seek to find 
justifications both for maintaining and – as appropriate – disturbing the status quo. To 
proceed further in the argument, we need a suitable analytical frame for understanding 
the dynamic effects on citizenship regimes of moves into and out of membership of the 
EU. 
 
IV Framing the citizenship consequences of seeking and shunning membership 
 
Both the EU level citizenship regime and those at the national level (and indeed the 
connections between the ‘levels’) are influenced by the decisions that states take when 
they seek or shun membership of the European Union. These states navigate, not always 
with a high degree of assurance, a continuum of integration and dis-integration 
involving dynamics of Europeanisation, de-Europeanisation and sometimes even re-
Europeanisation. They engage with other Member States and non-Member States, and 
with the EU institutions, in complex and often open-ended negotiations which reflect 
both their own policy preferences and the normative framework of EU law. These states 
and institutions take decisions which have consequences for the citizenship regimes of 
the departing or arriving Member States as well as for the EU (and its other Member 
States) as a whole. 
 
We can understand this best if we combine the analytical frames offered by both 
citizenship studies and European Union studies. By this means, we can show how 
Europeanisation and its various counterparts have ebbed and flowed, and how 
citizenship regimes themselves have evolved as a consequence (and how individuals 
and groups have reacted to this). To put it another way, Union citizenship is a product 
not only of a hesitant and fractured process of polity-building beyond the state but also 
of a move away from a predominantly state-centred conception of citizenship, if not 
(yet) the death of national citizenship. Union citizenship is normatively dependent upon 
national citizenship, and European integration creates intense bilateral and multilateral 
relationships between the national citizenship regimes of the Member States. Various 
forms of dual and multiple membership come into play, horizontally across the Member 
States, vertically between the Member States (and their subnational units) and the EU, 
and across the external borders of the EU, with third countries. These are examples of 
what Rainer Bauböck calls ‘citizenship constellations’.45 That is, they are ‘structure(s) 
in which individuals are simultaneously linked to several political entities, so that their 
                                                 
44  The idea of EU citizens (or future EU citizens) as welfare or ‘poverty’ migrants is reflected in 
the CJEU’s judgment in Case C-333/14 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, although the reality is that 
the migration picture into, across and out of the Western Balkans is rather mixed: International 
Organisation for Migration Report, Labour Migration Patterns, Policies and Migration 
Propensity in the Western Balkans, 2010 available at <https://publications.iom.int/books/labour-
migration-patterns-policies-and-migration-propensity-western-balkans>. 
45  R Bauböck, ‘Studying Citizenship Constellations’, (2010) 36 Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 847-859 at 848 
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legal rights and duties are determined not only by one political authority, but by 
several.’ These constellations contribute to reshaping our ideas about ‘what is 
citizenship?’. 
 
Applying insights from citizenship studies, such as the concept of citizenship 
constellations, in combination with insights from regional integration studies, such as 
concepts of de/Europeanisation, will help us to figure out where the boundaries and 
fractures within this contested concept of membership might lie. More broadly, as case 
studies, the citizenship dynamics of Brexit and stalled enlargement show that the story 
of the EU is not one of linear progress of integration towards ‘an ever closer union’, 
even though it is still quite common for Union citizenship to be lauded as somehow 
embodying this historic mission, in accordance with an ineluctable teleology of 
integration.46 Claims continue to be made about narratives of constitutionalism and, 
especially, constitutionalisation beyond the state, embodying the idea of a single shared 
citizenship as ‘Europe’s destiny’.47 The better view, however, is to recognise that there 
is no unidirectional process of Europeanisation in which the elements and constraints 
generated by Union citizenship are simply downloaded onto national citizenship 
regimes, with alterations to policies and institutions made accordingly.48 On the 
contrary, there are many (often ambivalent) narratives of Europeanisation and de-
Europeanisation simultaneously in play,49 as a result of which both national citizenship 
regimes as well as Union citizenship are likely to be transformed, as the two case 
studies will illustrate. 
 
Europeanisation is more than just the principle that membership of the EU requires 
states to comply with EU law and implement legislative measures and new 
administrative requirements introduced by the EU legislature (in which they 
participate).50 It is also a two-way track in which elements of national choice and 
institutional ‘style’ find their way into EU-wide measures and approaches to policy-
making as well as into its institutional forms, through national participation in those 
processes and institutions and also via various types of legal ‘borrowing’.51 From a legal 
perspective, it incorporates aspects of legal culture as well as formal compliance with 
EU law. In the enlargement context, Senka Neuman Stanivuković notes that ‘EU 
accession formulates new spaces of political action and creates novel forms of social 
organisation’, including in relation to ‘citizenship’.52 This is a broad and rather 
sociological concept of Europeanisation which also encompasses societal change as 
                                                 
46  D Kostakopoulou, ‘Scala Civium: Citizenship templates post-Brexit and the European Union’s 
duty to protect EU citizens’, (2018) 56 Journal of Common Market Studies 854-869. 
47  See Grzelczyk above n18. 
48  D Thym, ‘The Evolution of Citizens’ Rights in Light of the European Union’s Constitutional 
Development’, in Thym above n19.  
49  S Worschech, ‘The “making” of Europe in the peripheries: Europeanization through conflicts 
and ambivalences’, Culture, Practice & Europeanization, 2018, Vol. 3, No. 3, 56-76. 
50  T Börzel, ‘Pace setting, Foot dragging, and Fence sitting: Member State Responses to 
Europeanisation’, (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 193-214. 
51  For a practical example of the application of the insights of Europeanisation to the case of free 
movement (in the United Kingdom) see J Shaw, ‘Between Law and Political Truth? Member 
State Preferences, EU Free Movement Rules and National Immigration Law’, (2015) 17 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 247-286; see also A D’Angelo and E Kofman, 
‘From Mobile Workers to Fellow Citizens and Back Again? The Future Status of EU Citizens in 
the UK’, (2018) 17 Social Policy and Society 331-343. 
52  S Neuman Stanivuković, ‘Europeanisation of citizenship in the context of EU accession’, in J 
van der Harst et al above nError! Bookmark not defined. 157-185, at 157. 
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well as ‘the convergence of political cultures, the public sphere and collective 
identities’.53 In sum, 
 
Like modernisation or globalisation, Europeanisation also refers to large-scale 
processes of transformation of contemporary politics and society that are 
experienced by large groups of people and collectively interpreted. It affects not 
only economics and politics but also society, which is involved in its 
interpretation.54 
 
A similar approach is useful when analysing de-Europeanisation, which has received 
less attention than Europeanisation. De-Europeanisation has both formal and ideational 
elements and involves iterative interchange between the national and EU levels. At the 
supranational level, it is true that intergovernmental approaches to law and policy-
making are once again becoming more common, with a resurgence of control by the 
member states vis-à-vis the Commission and the CJEU.55 At the level of Member 
States, de-Europeanisation encompasses not just deviations in compliance, but also the 
alienation of (some) states from the core requirements or principles of integration, 
through practices such as flexibility and differentiated integration.56 It can also 
incorporate a distinction between ‘disengagement’ from the EU process and active 
‘dismantling’ of policies and institutions introduced for the purposes of compliance with 
EU law.57 At the boundaries of the EU, it can comprise the denial of accession to states 
and citizens, so that momentum towards national adjustment to European norms is 
stalled as the prospect of enlargement recedes into the distance.58 De-Europeanisation 
also encompasses the hitherto unknown phenomenon of exit or withdrawal from the 
Union, where a Member State negotiates its exit from the EU, but also, for the future, a 
revised relationship with the EU and its Member States as a third country (which may 
also involve some elements of re-Europeanisation). Within the withdrawing state, as 
Burns et al have pointed out, the terms of withdrawal (and the relatively strong 
embeddedness of EU origin policies and institutions at the domestic level) may lead to 
more disengagement (and neglect) than actual dismantling. This will vary between 
different policy areas. Withdrawal of a Member State may lead to relatively little 
change within the EU itself, although some scholars have now started to explore the 
broader phenomenon of disintegration.59 
 
                                                 
53  HJ Trenz, The Saga of Europeanisation On the Narrative Construction of a European Society, 
ARENA Working Paper 7/2014. 
54  Trenz, above n53 at 2. 
55  CJ Bickerton, D Hodson and U Puetter, ‘The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration 
in the Post‐Maastricht Era’, (2015) 53 Journal of Common Market Studies 703-722. 
56  R Adler Niessen, Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European 
Integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014). 
57  C Burns et al, ‘De-Europeanising or disengaging? EU environmental policy and Brexit’, (2019) 
28 Environmental Politics 271-292 at 273. 
58  See the case of Turkey: S Aydın-Düzgit and A Kaliber, ‘Encounters with Europe in an Era of 
Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?’, (2016) 
21 South European Society and Politics 1-14.  
59  Thus far there has been relatively little scholarly attention focused on disintegration and de-
Europeanisation. See W Outhwaite, ‘De-Europeanisation after Brexit: narrowing and 
shallowing’, (2019) 9 Global Discourse 15-30; H Vollaard, ‘Explaining European 
disintegration’, (2014) 52 Journal of Common Market Studies 1142-1159; B Rosamond, ‘Brexit 
and the problem of European disintegration’, (2016) 12 Journal of Contemporary European 
Research 864-871. 
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Just like Europeanisation, citizenship is a complex phenomenon. It cannot simply be 
understood as a static, top-down, imposed legal framework, in which individuals are 
given and denied rights or conferred statuses without exercising agency. It is a dynamic 
and relational concept, rather than a fixed structure, combining plural and multi-level 
institutional elements as well as the bottom-up practices of citizens as legal and political 
actors in a non-state context. These practices and resources have been struggled over 
and contested throughout history and they continue to have both legal and symbolic 
resonances and effects.60 Citizenship might posit an ideal of equality, but real life 
involves a heterogeneity of citizenship ‘experiences’, with vectors of gender, class, race 
and other factors such as ideas about ‘security’ always conditioning the practical 
enjoyment of rights or the capacity effectively to perform attendant ‘duties’. Citizenship 
rights have not been even remotely ‘equally’ allocated at least until well into the 
twentieth century in most if not all countries. As Claudia Wiesner et al state, 
‘citizenship in all its dimensions is never neutral, but positioned.’61 Another way of 
characterizing citizenship in these terms is to describe it as ‘uneven’.62 
 
The idea of a variety of ‘citizenship experiences’ is as relevant in the context of Union 
citizenship as it is at the national level. It can be illustrated by reference to the 
differentiated set of protections and privileges embedded deep within Union citizenship, 
with many groups not enjoying ‘full’ citizenship, as predicated on the market freedoms 
which remain at the core of the concept. This apes the market and political inequalities 
that lie at the heart of national citizenship. What emerges is a picture of citizenship in 
the composite and complex euro-polity as a differentiated, rather than a uniform status. 
In that sense, it reveals similarities to national citizenship. Both offer a promise of 
equality, but a reality of differentiation. 
 
For example, not all free movers are ‘workers’ or ‘self-employed persons’ enjoying the 
maximum benefits of EU law. Some are students or retired persons who have to prove 
their self-sufficiency or satisfy other conditions, or dependent members of citizen 
families who do not accrue rights such as permanent residence easily under the current 
rules, even in spite of very long residence. What is more, variations in relation to the 
protective cloak of Union citizenship will also be translated into key vectors of 
vulnerability and discrimination across lines of disability, gender, sexuality, race, 
religious and ethnic minority, class, age, documented status, as well as language usage. 
Women are more likely to be carers, and carers are not easily recognised in the EU legal 
order.63 Ethnic minorities such as the Roma are less likely to be effectively integrated 
into labour markets.64 Children experience their Union citizenship as dependents in 
different ways to adults.65 In practice, therefore, many mobile EU citizens struggle to 
gain the residence statuses which are essential to enjoying full and effective protection 
of the equal treatment principle within the welfare states of most of the Member 
                                                 
60  Wiesner et al above n20 at 1. 
61  Wiesner et al above n20 at 10. 
62  G Krasniqi and D Stjepanović, ‘Uneven Citizenship: Minorities and Migrants in the Post-
Yugoslav Space’, (2015) 14 Ethnopolitics 113-120. 
63  E Caracciolo di Torella, ‘The Unintended Consequences of Brexit: the Case of Work-Life 
Balance’, in M. Dustin et al. (eds.), Gender and Queer Perspectives on Brexit (Palgrave, Cham, 
2019), 61-91. 
64  J Sardelić, ‘The position and agency of the ‘irregularized’: Romani migrants as European semi-
citizens’, (2017) 37 Politics 332-346. 
65  H Stalford, Children and the European Union: Rights, Welfare and Accountability (Hart, 
Oxford, 2012). 
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States.66 Those whose lives are marginal to the underlying economic purposes of free 
movement are often poorly protected against the risk of deportation or other forms of 
removal or rejection. For example, while unemployment and even rough sleeping 
resulting from destitution is not as such a reason for removal under EU law, in practice 
members of these groups are much more vulnerable than others.67 
 
Each case of legal marginality stems from the conditions imposed on free movement 
rights within EU law but it also relies upon an elision in domestic political debate and 
public opinion, not to mention in public policy and executive action, of any real 
distinction between ‘immigration’ more generally and ‘free movement’ as a special 
case.68 The legal statuses may be differentiated, but in the public perception the 
activities are often not. Many recent developments in EU free movement policy, 
including changes introduced in CJEU case law, have in fact flowed from national 
debates on issues such as welfare benefits for EU citizens and the impact of ‘posted 
workers’ operating within the sphere of the free movement of services which have 
elided free movement and immigration.69 Union citizenship is, in sum, rather like a 
protective – but limited – cloak for certain national citizens. 
 
Beyond the arena of free movement, there are some other areas where the EU has 
shaped and constrained Member State sovereignty in relation to nationality law.70 
Through cases such as Micheletti,71 Ruiz Zambrano72 and Rottmann,73 the Court of 
Justice has developed a doctrine which recognises that Member States must have due 
regard to the implications of EU law when making decisions about nationality or 
residence rights which may have the effect of depriving individuals of the enjoyment of 
their Union citizenship rights. These cases have involved the putative loss of the 
benefits of Union citizenship through the loss or non-recognition of national citizenship 
or rights. One question that remains unanswered is the extent to which these same 
principles could apply to the acquisition of national citizenship.  
 
In 2019, the European Commission issued a report on Investor Citizenship and 
Residence Schemes in the European Union, exploring how these arrangements for 
granting citizenship as the counterparty for a financial contribution to the state had 
proliferated within the EU, how they might fit with Union citizenship law, and what 
impact they might also have in other areas of EU law such as the fight against 
                                                 
66  C Bruzelius, ‘Freedom of movement, social rights and residence-based conditionality in the 
European Union’ (2019) 19 Journal of European Social Policy 70–83; M Tervonen and A 
Enache, ‘Coping with everyday bordering: Roma migrants and gatekeepers in Helsinki’, (2017) 
40 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1114-1131. 
67  C O’Brien, ‘Civis capitalist sum: Class as the new guiding principle of EU free movement 
rights’, (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 937-977.  
68  Shaw above n51. 
69  C Barnard and S Butlin, ‘Free movement vs Fair Movement: Brexit and Managed Migration’, 
(2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 203-226; N Mussche et al, ‘How posting shapes a 
hybrid single European labour market’, (2018) 24 European Journal of Industrial Relations 
113–127. 
70  See Shaw, Still a Fundamental Status?, above n38; H Oosterom-Staples, ‘The Triangular 
Relationship Between Nationality, EU Citizenship and Migration in EU Law: A Tale of 
Competing Competences’, (2018) 65 Netherlands International Law Review 431-461. 
71  Case C-369/90 ECLI:EU:C:1992:295. 
72  Case C-34/09 ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 
73  Case C-135/08 ECLI:EU:C:2010:104. 
 15 
corruption, organized crime and indeed tax evasion.74 While the Commission’s attempt 
to influence the laws of Member States in the area of citizenship acquisition on the basis 
of a putative principle of ‘genuine links’75 as the basis for the citizenship relationship 
may be relatively weak in doctrinal terms,76 none the less the Commission remains 
within its rights to remind the Member States that one of the main reasons why those 
who have the requisite resources might wish to purchase one of the national citizenships 
which are on sale is because it brings with it also the added benefits of Union 
citizenship. It can be argued that this brings certain responsibilities. That is, under the 
treaties as they stand, Member States are bound by a duty of loyalty that requires them 
to ‘refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives’.77 This is one of the cornerstones of the idea of a progressive integration or 
‘ever closer Union’ amongst the peoples of Europe. This reminder about the network of 
reciprocal duties in respect of citizenship regimes in which the Member States stand – 
albeit it has not been proven exactly what the nature of those legal duties might be – 
provides an important backdrop for reassessing the ‘value’ of citizenship in the context 
of the two cases of ‘shunning’ and ‘seeking’ membership of the EU to which I shall 
now turn. 
 
We can now examine the case studies in the light of the conclusion, which has emerged 
from the juxtaposition of citizenship studies and regional integration studies in this 
section. We have a ‘Europe of many citizenships’ (and of many non-citizenships and 
semi-citizenships), marked by a great deal of market-driven heterogeneity as well 
limited elements of unity. The narratives in the following sections focus on the political 
background to processes of Europeanisation, de-Europeanisation and re-
Europeanisation, on important legal changes, and on how the climate of uncertainty 
and/or frustration with these changes (or the lack of them) leads individuals to pursue 
other options, such as seeking another passport, or deciding to move to another country. 
The narratives will show that in the context of the multilevel architecture of citizenship 
in Europe, with the ebb and flow of Europeanisation and integration/dis-integration 
processes, the two cases of shunned and stalled membership involving contestations at 
the peripheries of the EU provide good illustrations of a differentiated and often 
hierarchical concept of Union citizenship, which excludes as much as it includes. 
 
V Brexit and the de-Europeanisation of (UK) citizenship 
 
At first sight, Brexit seems to involve a straightforward process of de-Europeanisation 
and re-nationalisation (i.e., withdrawal of the UK from the EU and reassertion of UK 
                                                 
74  European Commission, Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union, 
COM(2019) 12, 23 January 2019;  for a brief review, see Džankić, What’s in the EC’s report on 
investor citizenship?, GlobalCIT Blog, 23 January 2019, available at <http://globalcit.eu/whats-
in-the-ecs-report-on-investor-citizenship/>.  
75  Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm) [1955] ICJ 1. 
76  R Thwaites, ‘The Life and Times of the Genuine Link’, (2018) 49 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 645-670; A Macklin, ‘Is it Time to Retire Nottebohm?’ (2017) 111 
American Journal of International Law Unbound 492-497. Looked at purely from the 
perspective of citizenship competences, the Commission’s position looks rather weak (J Shaw, 
‘Citizenship for Sale: Could and Should the EU Intervene?’ in R Bauböck (ed) Debating 
Transformations of National Citizenship, IMISCOE Research Series (Springer International, 
Cham, 2018) but that is before we factor in questions related to its competences on issues such 
as money laundering and financial crime. 
77  Article 4(3) third sentence TEU. 
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sovereignty). It offers, in principle, the opportunity for the UK to favour its own citizens 
over all other groups (e.g. in the labour market or in relation to public goods) and to re-
enact symbols of national sovereignty such as dark blue passports. 
 
Given the length of the UK’s membership of the EU and the complex intertwining of 
the UK’s citizenship regime and those of the other Member States and of the EU itself, 
the citizenship consequences of Brexit are set to be legion. Brexit itself is unlikely to be 
a clean break, when, or if, the UK ever leaves the EU, but also involves probable 
elements of re-Europeanisation. Assuming the Withdrawal Agreement agreed at the 
political level in November 201878 (along with the accompanying Political Declaration 
on the UK’s future relationship with the EU79) is eventually signed, ratified and brought 
into force, there will be a transition period that could last until the end of 2020 or 
longer. During this time, free movement (in both directions) would continue although 
UK citizens would no longer be Union citizens. However, it is unlikely that any final 
status agreement between the EU and the now third country UK will be ready for many 
years, raising the question of whether transition will be extended, perhaps indefinitely, 
or whether there will be a further ‘cliff edge’ threat each time the end of transition 
comes close. It is still unclear what any future status agreement might say in relation to 
the issue of immigration, 80 unless the UK opts for an arrangement akin to that of the 
EEA countries (e.g. Norway81), which includes free movement (but not Union 
citizenship) as an element of the single market, or Switzerland, which has a dense and 
complex network of bilateral agreements with the EU including on free movement of 
persons.82 The Political Declaration, as it stands, although vague, presages the end of 
free movement and points towards a future free trade agreement in the nature of that 
between the EU and Canada, which says nothing about immigration.83 
 
Brexit, in sum, is more process than endstate, and it is hard to predict where it might go 
in the future. The current leitmotiv is uncertainty and lives ‘in limbo’, not just because 
Brexit is an unprecedented situation, but also because the politics of Brexit have 
become particularly fraught. With UK parliamentary processes for agreeing the 
                                                 
78  For the formalities to allow for signature of the Withdrawal Agreement, see Council Decision 
2019/274, ECLI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2019/274/oj. The text of the Withdrawal 
Agreement as at 25 November 2018 is published in OJ 2019 C66 I/1. For discussion of the 
citizens’ rights aspects seek O Garner, ‘Citizens’ Rights in the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement: 
Ossifying EU citizenship as a juridical status?’, GlobalCIT Blog, 28 November 2018, available 
at <http://globalcit.eu/citizens-rights-in-the-uk-eu-withdrawal-agreement-ossifying-eu-
citizenship-as-a-juridical-status/>. 
79  Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom, 22 November 2018, OJ 2019 C66 I/185. 
80  In her Mansion House speech in March 2018, Prime Minister May seemed to suggest there 
might be a special status in the UK for EU immigration after Brexit but this has yet to be 
translated into concrete policy. Available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
03-02/prime-minister-theresa-may-lays-out-her-brexit-vision-text>. 
81  JE Fossum and HP Graver, Squaring the Circle on Brexit: Could the Norway Model Work? 
(Bristol University Press, Bristol, 2018). 
82  Details of the Swiss/EU arrangements on the Swiss Confederal Government website are 
available at <https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/themen/fza_schweiz-eu-efta.html>. 
83  A strict separation has been maintained between the Withdrawal Agreement and the future 
arrangements for immigration between the EU and the UK, reinforced by the deletion of an 
earlier Article 32 from the draft Withdrawal Agreement, concerning immigration matters, as it 
belonged only in the future relationship agreement. For discussion see N Nic Shuibhne, ‘Brexit 
Roundup: Free Movement and the Limits of EU Citizenship’, Scottish Centre on European 
Relations Blog, 18 April 2018, available at: <https://www.scer.scot/database/ident-5635>. 
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Withdrawal Agreement stalled at the end of 2018 and throughout the first half of 2019, 
all the relevant parties (i.e. the UK,84 the EU itself,85 and the other Member States) were 
forced to put in place draft or conditional legislation to apply in the case of a ‘no deal’ 
Brexit. Such an eventuality could immediately transform the status of already resident 
EU27 citizens in the UK, or UK citizens in the EU27, into the same as that of other 
third country nationals. They might struggle to show any lawful excuse to be present on 
the territory, to be in employment or to be in receipt of welfare benefits. These 
conservatory measures differ across the countries.86 While de-Europeanisation in the 
event of no deal will occur quite sharply (and painfully) across many policy areas, its 
effects will perhaps be sharpest of all in relation to matters of free movement, with the 
UK Government having rapidly put in place the necessary draft legal infrastructure to 
ensure that all ‘new arrivals’ after a no deal Brexit would be dealt with under the default 
rules of UK immigration law.87 There is no doubt that the highly centralised nature of 
UK immigration law makes it possible for the government to institute such a rapid 
change of course.88 
 
One of the mantras of the successful leave campaign became that the UK should ‘take 
back control’, specifically of ‘our laws, our borders, and our money’. The UK 
government, led by Prime Minister Theresa May since shortly after the referendum, 
interpreted this as mandating the termination of free movement. This is a political 
choice and a ‘red’ line which limits the options for the UK’s future status. If free 
movement does end, it does so not only for EU27 citizens in the UK, but also for UK 
citizens in the EU27. This point is often neglected in UK discussions; the dominant 
rhetoric has been that free movement towards the UK is the challenge to be dealt with, 
even though economic evidence points in the direction of it having benefited the UK.89 
The reciprocity of free movement receives little attention and British ‘expats’, as they 
are always termed in the media, have found it hard to gain traction for their claims that 
they too stand to lose a number of valuable benefits, such as options for future onward 
                                                 
84  See Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill, for details of passage 
through Parliament see <https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2019/parliamentary-news-
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preparedness/residence-rights-uk-nationals-eu-member-states_en>.  
87  CJ McKinney, ‘Sweeping new immigration regulations herald the end of free movement’, Free 
Movement Blog, 13 February 2019, available at <https://www.freemovement.org.uk/sweeping-
new-immigration-regulations-herald-the-end-of-free-movement/>. For an analysis of the general 
situation before the publication of the UK’s recent materials, but after positions papers by both 
the UK and the European Commission, see S Peers, ‘Staring into the abyss: Citizens’ Rights 
after a No Deal Brexit, EU Law Analysis Blog, 6 December 2018, available at: 
<eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/12/staring-into-abyss-citizens-rights.html>.  
88  Cf. Burns et al above n57 on the ease of dismantling centralised policy areas with few dispersed 
stakeholders. 
89  S Dhingra et al, Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK, CEPBrexit05, May 2016. 
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mobility.90 Furthermore, when possible future mobility restrictions for UK citizens are 
raised, these are criticised as being examples of the EU ‘punishing’ the UK.91 On the 
contrary, it is perfectly reasonable that UK citizens – as third country nationals – would 
be subject to the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) 
which was agreed in 2018 by the EU legislature for application within the Schengen 
zone and which will be in operation from 2021.92 Like the US ‘ESTA’, it is not a visa 
(UK citizens will be able to travel visa-free to the EU93) but an advance travel 
authorisation system subject to a modest fee (in return for an ETIAS valid for several 
years) and a criminal records check. It is equally unsurprising that UK citizens resident 
in Schengen area for more than three months must obtain a visa, although this will in 
many cases be a matter for national law. This is unlikely to affect those already resident, 
assuming there is either a Withdrawal Agreement or comprehensive unilateral coverage 
in the event of no deal, but is likely to affect future student mobility, as well as the 
travels of holiday-home owners and those seeking to make longer trips whether for 
work, leisure or to provide services.94 
 
The process of de-Europeanisation has already given rise to many difficulties and 
anxieties.95 All international negotiations necessarily involve the principle that ‘nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed’, so that mobile EU citizens on either side of the 
equation (in the UK or the EU27) have made ideal bargaining chips. Pleas to offer 
unilateral guarantees to mobile EU citizens – even if heeded – would have inevitably 
left some groups out and would simply shift the focus of uncertainty and vulnerability 
to different places.96 Latterly, as the risk of no deal has risen, there have been calls, 
including an amendment adopted by Parliament, to deal with citizens’ rights separately 
to the rest of the Withdrawal Agreement, though this suggestion has not been positively 
received by the European Commission.97 Given the complexities of lives, it is 
impossible for any Withdrawal Agreement to cover all eventualities,98 and it is already 
visible from the early roll out of the arrangements to gain so-called Settled Status, 
                                                 
90  For further information see the findings of the research project Brexit Brits Abroad 
<https://brexitbritsabroad.com/>. 
91  For an analysis, see J Lis, ‘No, we’re not being bullied by the EU over Brexit’, Prospect 
Magazine, 2 November 2018, available at:  <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/the-
myth-of-brexit-as-punishment>. 
92  Regulation (EU) 2018/1240 ECLI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1240/oj and Regulation 
(EU) 2018/1241, ECLI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1241/oj. 
93  Regulation (EU) 2019/592, ECLI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/592/oj. 
94  M Klaassen, ‘The status of UK citizens in the EU after Brexit’, Leiden Law Blog, 7 February 
2019, available at:  <https://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/the-status-of-uk-citizens-in-the-eu-after-
brexit>. 
95  S Peers, ‘EU27 and UK citizens’ acquired rights in the Brexit withdrawal agreement: detailed 
analysis and annotation’ EU Law Analysis, 13 March 2018, available at: 
<eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2018/03/eu27-and-uk-citizens-acquired-rights-in.html>; R Ranta 
and N Nancheva, ‘Unsettled: Brexit and European Union nationals’ sense of belonging’ (2019) 
25 Population, Space and Place, DOI: 10.1002/psp.2199; Guma and Dafydd Jones, above n21. 
96  On the options for unilateral protection or ringfencing, see S Smismans, ‘Six Brexit scenarios for 
citizens’ rights’, The UK in a Changing Europe Blog, 12 October 2018, available here: 
<https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/six-brexit-scenarios-for-citizens-rights/> 
97  For the background see S Smismans, Ring-Fencing Citizens’ Rights in the Brexit Negotiations: 
Legal Framework and Political Dynamics DCU Brexit Institute - Working Paper N.1 – 2019, 28 
January 2019. 
98  I. Solanke, ‘Who Speaks for the Zambrano Families? Multi-level Abandonment in the UK and 
EU’, in M Dustin above n63 at 151-183. 
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intended to cover those already resident in the UK,99 that more risks will fall precisely 
upon the vulnerable and marginal categories of EU citizens identified in the previous 
section, such as those with caring responsibilities that keep them out of the labour 
market, those who are older (especially those who arrived before the UK became part of 
the EU), those who are disabled, or even those who experience periods of 
unemployment that are deemed to render them a burden on the state.100 The other group 
that is vulnerable are those who have even a minor criminal conviction.101 Moreover, 
the position of children may be complex as they are dependent upon their parents taking 
the appropriate steps towards settlement, and when they become adults they may find 
that they lack the necessary documentation, both in terms of residence and 
citizenship.102 It should also be noted that the specific complexities of citizenship in 
Northern Ireland could give rise to particular difficulties.103 As Oliver Garner has 
argued, the gaps in the Withdrawal Agreement will undoubtedly be litigated in the 
national courts, and before the CJEU or some other bespoke court, highlighting the 
complexities of de-Europeanisation104 Scholars and activists also fear that there will be 
an implementation and enforcement gap, if institutions to assist EU citizens in 
navigating any new systems are not established,105 and if the correct approach to EU 
                                                 
99  Details of the UK’s Settled Status and Pre-Settled Status for EU and EEA citizens who have 
been in the UK for five years (or less in the case of pre-settled status): 
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Citizens in the UK, A Report for British Future by Jill Rutter and Steve Ballinger, January 2019, 
available at: <http://www.britishfuture.org/articles/eu-settlement-scheme/>. 
100  See M Sumption and Z Kone, Unsettled Status. Which EU citizens are at risk of failing to secure 
their rights after Brexit?, Migration Observatory Report, COMPAS, University of Oxford, 12 
April 2018, available at: <http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Report-Unsettled_Status.pdf>; see also S Zawacki, ‘Fear Mounts as 
Roma Prepare to Apply for Post-Brexit Settled Status in the UK’, The Conversation, 22 August 
2018, available at: <https://theconversation.com/fear-mounts-as-roma-prepare-to-apply-for-post-
brexit-settled-status-in-the-uk-100710> and ILPA briefing, EU Settled Status Automated Data 
Checks, 30 January 2019, available at: <http://www.ilpa.org.uk/resources.php/35100/eu-settled-
status-automated-data-checks-ilpa-research-piece-30-january-2019>.  
101  A Bulat, ‘The rights of non-UK EU citizens living here are not a “done deal”. This is why’, LSE 
Brexit Blog, 27 February 2018, available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/02/27/the-
rights-of-non-uk-eu-citizens-living-here-are-not-a-done-deal-this-is-why/>. In response to legal 
action brought by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, changes were made in that 
area to the Scheme by the Home Office in March 2019. For details see: 
<https://www.freemovement.org.uk/home-office-softens-eu-settled-status-requirements-after-
charitys-legal-action/>. 
102  C Yeo, ‘The impact of the UK-EU agreement on residence rights for EU families’, Eurochildren 
Research Brief, 1, 2018; C Yeo, ‘The impact of the UK-EU agreement on citizenship rights for 
EU families’, Eurochildren Research Brief, 2, 2018. 
103  B Warwick, ‘A Windrush in waiting: post-Brexit categories of citizen in Northern Ireland’, LSE 
Brexit Blog, 11 September 2018, available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/09/11/a-
windrush-in-waiting-post-brexit-categories-of-citizen-in-northern-ireland/>.  
104  O Garner, ‘Citizens’ Rights in the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement: Ossifying EU citizenship as 
a juridical status?’, GlobalCIT Blog, 28 November 2018, available at: 
<http://globalcit.eu/citizens-rights-in-the-uk-eu-withdrawal-agreement-ossifying-eu-citizenship-
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authority to monitor their rights’, LSE Brexit Blog, 26 March 2018, available at: 
<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/26/eu-citizens-in-the-uk-need-a-independent-authority-
to-monitor-their-rights/>. 
 20 
law in the UK is not taken.106 Finally, it should be noted that once again rather more 
attention has been paid to the situation of EU27 citizens resident in the UK than to that 
of UK citizens resident in the EU27.107 
 
Prospects for the loss of Union citizenship (and the associated rights which this gives) 
have provoked unprecedented levels of mobilisation,108 including calls to save Union 
citizenship for some or all UK citizens, perhaps through a form of ‘associate 
citizenship’.109 This plea seems utopian as well as impractical in a legal sense.110 NGOs 
have mobilised to scrutinise the negotiating process and press for the best outcome 
possible in the event of withdrawal for UK and EU27 citizens, a challenging task in the 
face of a constantly changing landscape of proposals and counter-proposals.111 Work 
has been undertaken to document the ‘in limbo’ experienced by those directly 
affected.112 Some individuals have chosen to turn their back on free movement by 
returning to their state of citizenship or choosing not to move, to avoid facing Brexit 
uncertainties,113 while others are sitting tight waiting to see what strategy the UK and 
the EU/other Member States pursue. For another group, the preferred strategy has been 
to collapse their acts of Union citizenship back into acts of national citizenship, by 
obtaining citizenship of the host state (naturalisation), by seeking or re-activating a 
second ‘backstop’ citizenship (e.g., by ancestry or family ties),114 or by making use of a 
default second citizenship (as in the case of UK citizens born in Northern Ireland who 
can choose to be Irish or British or both under the Good Friday Agreement).115 For 
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those wealthy enough, there exists the option of purchasing citizenships and residencies 
in a number of Member States with minimal physical residence obligations.116 Many of 
these strategies – involving what Yossi Harpaz calls ‘compensatory citizenships’ – call 
for a closer look at the ever more complex relationship between Union citizenship and 
national citizenship, already hinted at in the previous section.117 
 
Union citizenship is a creature of EU law, but it is based on access points controlled 
under national law. The McCarthy case suggested that those with dual citizenship of the 
host state and another Member State do not enjoy the protection of EU law as regards 
the right to reside because the situation is one that is purely internal to the host state.118 
More recently, the Lounes case took a different approach in the case of a person who 
naturalised after having migrated to the host state.119 Furthermore, the CJEU has held 
that EU law requires the possibility of judicial review of decisions on deprivation of 
national citizenship, if this would have the effect of depriving an EU citizen of 
substantially all of the benefits of Union citizenship. However, this proposition was 
developed for a scenario where it was the actions of the EU citizen in question – in 
combination with national citizenship laws – which triggered the scenario in which he 
or she was deprived of the benefits of Union citizenship120 and has not always been 
received favourably at the national level.121 It is not yet known how the CJEU might 
approach the question of loss of Union citizenship because a Member State withdraws 
from the EU.122 A lower court referral of such a question to the CJEU in the 
Netherlands in a case raised before it by aggrieved UK citizens fearing loss of their 
Union citizenship was subsequently overturned on appeal.123 In any event, the prospects 
for success in such a case are rather limited.124  
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Absent an international agreement specifically preserving the status of Union 
citizenship or certain rights attaching to it, it seems obvious that a withdrawing state 
retains the power, under international law, to deprive its citizens of the status of EU 
citizen, and to render the legal effect of that status, for citizens of other continuing 
Member States, nugatory within its territory. The Court of Justice in the Wightman case 
confirmed this scenario implicitly by noting that 
 
since citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States any withdrawal of a Member State from the 
European Union is liable to have a considerable impact on the rights of all 
Union citizens, including, inter alia, their right to free movement, as regards 
both nationals of the Member State concerned and nationals of other Member 
States.125 
 
In similar terms, other Member States have no obligation to treat UK citizens other than 
as third country nationals on their territory, subject to the requirements of the 
Withdrawal Agreement or the normal rules of EU law relating, for example, to long 
term resident non-EU citizens.126 Furthermore, the European Commission has not 
pushed the issue at all, and has – according to Steve Peers – displayed indifference to 
the situation to be faced by UK citizens in the event of a no deal Brexit.127 In addition, 
as a type of backstop, there should be protection of non-citizen residents of the 
withdrawing or remaining states in relation to certain rights, such as family life, under 
international human rights law (which may not require very long residence). The Kuric 
case of the European Court of Human Rights128 appears to ‘freeze’ the rights of those 
who have regular residence in the host state and who do not accede to the citizenship of 
that state when it ‘secedes’ (i.e., in the case of the EU, withdraws).129 Although 
developed in the context of the secession of Slovenia from the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, the principles in this case should be applied by analogy 
to a UK withdrawal from the EU to protect the minimum rights of affected persons in 
the UK and the EU27.130 This residual protection may be the limit of the ‘stickiness’ of 
Union citizenship after Brexit. 
 
One possible caveat upon the general principle that national citizenship is unaffected by 
Brexit was to be anticipated in the Tjebbes case, concerning legislation withdrawing 
Dutch citizenship from persons who are resident for more than 10 years in a third 
country and who have taken on that country’s citizenship.131 Such a case has obvious 
implications for the post-Brexit scenario, as the UK will be such a ‘third country’ after 
Brexit, so any intervention by the CJEU to suggest that Member States are not free to 
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withdraw citizenship in such circumstances could be for the benefit of those resident in 
the UK who, unlike UK citizens, face restrictions on holding dual citizenship. In July 
2018, Advocate General Mengozzi issued his Opinion concluding that Netherlands law 
was incompatible with EU law as regards the effects on minors, but not adults.132 
However, the CJEU declined to follow the Advocate General, finding that the law in 
this case is compatible with EU law and with citizenship of the Union, provided that 
each case is reviewed individually and providing authorities – and courts as appropriate 
– can determine that the loss of nationality that entails the loss of Union citizenship is 
proportionate, bearing in mind the consequences for the person affected and, if relevant, 
members of their family. This is line with earlier cases such as Rottmann, and opens the 
way at least for individuals insist on judicial review of their particular circumstances. 
This could mean that individuals will seek to have the Netherlands authorities have 
regard to circumstances outwith their control, if the UK does exit the EU. 
 
We could certainly postulate that adjustments to national citizenship laws might be a 
desirable part of the solution to the upheaval brought about by Brexit. But the UK is 
making no moves to facilitate citizenship access for resident non-citizens, despite the 
loss of their preferential ‘free mover’ status. On the contrary, it seems that this group 
must accommodate themselves to the UK’s requirements, rather than the other way 
around, by applying for ‘settled status’ even though this falls far short of both national 
citizenship and of the protections and freedoms previously offered by Union 
citizenship.133 Somewhat begrudgingly, though, the UK Government did remove the fee 
of £65 attached to this registration requirement in January 2019.134 Many EU citizens 
resident in the UK are pursuing the UK citizenship route despite the considerable 
expense and the numerous bureaucratic hurdles in place.135 For children born in the UK, 
there may be options to register as UK citizens, depending upon their parents’ status at 
the time of birth and how long they have lived here, although this process is also 
expensive and difficult.136 The irony is that many are seeking UK citizenship not 
because they feel more integrated in the UK, but precisely because they face more 
hostility than ever before. A wave of xenophobia has been unleashed by the UK’s 
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‘Brexit experience’,137 with consequent mental health impacts.138 The UK feels less like 
home for this group and so the form of security offered by formal citizenship seems 
more desirable. In one sense, those naturalizing are accepting the veracity of Theresa 
May’s post-Brexit dictum: ‘if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen 
of nowhere and you don’t know what citizenship is.’139 They are making themselves 
citizens of somewhere: the United Kingdom. 
 
Initially, there was no sign of Member States with restrictive approaches to dual 
citizenship, such as the Netherlands, Lithuania, Estonia or Austria, making adjustments 
to citizenship law to accommodate resident UK citizens or to protect their own citizens’ 
interests in relation to the loss of Union citizenship status in the UK. On the contrary, 
the Prime Minister of the Netherlands appeared to double down on his country’s 
resistance to dual citizenship.140 However, perhaps in a harbinger of further changes to 
come, in October 2017 the incoming Dutch coalition adopted a more liberal approach to 
dual citizenship, offering assurances to Dutch citizens resident in the UK that they 
would be able to keep their Netherlands citizenship after naturalising in the UK,141 
although concrete steps have yet to be taken. In its Brexit preparations, Germany 
proposed to extend the leeway to protect dual citizenship given to EU citizens to those 
UK and German citizens who have applied for, but not yet received, the citizenship of 
the other country on the date of the UK withdrawal to benefit from dual citizenship.142 
 
There remained still many mixed-nationality families, as well as highly mobile persons, 
who find that national citizenship acquisition does not match up to the fluid flexible 
possibilities of Union citizenship and free movement. Engaging with UK governmental 
authorities has thrown up not just practical, but also symbolic issues. According to 
Roberto Gonzales and Nando Sigona this is to do with 
 
the distance between a normative construction of the EU citizen as 
someone who feels at home everywhere in the EU and is valued for 
embracing freedom of movement within the EU, both long and short term, 
and that of the immigrant in the UK who may see their chances of 
                                                 
137  See House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: acquired rights, 10th Report of Session 
2016–17, HL Paper 82; Guma and Dafydd Jones above n21; Ranta above n95. 
138  A Heald et al, ‘The LEAVE vote and racial abuse towards Black and Minority Ethnic 
communities across the UK: the impact on mental health’ (2018) 111 Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine 158–161;  
139  The full text of May’s speech is available at: 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-in-full/>.  
140  ‘Dutch nationals taking UK citizenship ‘will lose Netherlands passports’’, The Guardian, 17 
July 2017; available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/17/dutch-nationals-
brexit-uk-citizenship-lose-netherlands-passports-mark-rutte>. 
141  See ‘Brexit: Dutch nationals living in Britain will be allowed dual citizenship’, The Guardian, 
10 October 2017, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/10/dutch-
nationals-living-britain-allowed-dual-citizenship-brexit>; ‘D66 calls for relaxation of dual 
nationality rules for people hit by Brexit’, Dutch News, 28 January 2019 available at: 
<https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/01/d66-calls-for-relaxation-of-dual-nationality-rules-for-
people-hit-by-brexit/>.  
142  See ‘Brexit Transition Act’, Federal Foreign Office, 1 February 2019 available at: 
<https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europa/transitional-brexitact/2119778>. 
 25 
permanent residency jeopardised if they happen to have spent too many 
days abroad.143 
 
These feelings in relation to ‘home’144 will become all the more intense as the UK 
continues down the track towards leaving the EU, and as the current set of legal 
arrangements is superseded by others based at least partly on the disciplining 
force of national immigration law, rather than the enabling principles of freedom 
of movement or the constitutional notion of the ‘citizen of the Union’. These 
dislocated feelings of being let down by state and international institutions in 
relation to the opportunities offered by Union citizenship, at least on the part of 
those for whom the reality of Union citizenship has become a social fact, may 
bear some similarities to the loss of hope and expectation experienced by citizens 
of the states of south east Europe, as I shall show in the next section. They are 
exacerbated by the fact that very few of the most directly affected persons had a 
right to vote in the referendum, with the exception of Irish and Commonwealth 
EU (i.e. Maltese and Cypriot) citizens resident in the UK and UK citizens resident 
outside the UK for fewer than 15 years.145 
 
This case study of the de-Europeanisation and re-Europeanisation of citizenship – 
although still shrouded in uncertainty – illustrates the messy unravelling of the 
UK’s membership of the euro-polity. It highlights too that the consequences are 
not limited to simple binary changes (UK citizens cease to be Union citizens; UK 
territory ceases to be part of the EU), not least because of the need to protect those 
whose lives have been constructed on the basis of an assumption of the durability 
of the protective cloak of Union citizenship and because of the agency of 
individuals in relation to multiple incidents of citizenship. Consequently, the 
Brexit process has to be seen not just a negotiation between the UK and the 
European Commission (acting on behalf of the institutions and the EU27) but also 
as a range of actions on the part of individuals and groups incentivised to change 
their legal situation as a consequence of the threats to the status quo posed by the 
UK’s referendum result.146 In the next section, we will see to what extent there are 
parallels to be drawn between these observations and the case of stalled 
enlargement. 
 
VI The stalled Europeanisation of citizenship in south east Europe 
 
The shadow that Union citizenship will cast after the UK leaves the EU (based on the 
complexity of untangling existing legal obligations) inevitably differs from the shadow 
cast by Union citizenship on candidate or putative candidate states and their citizenship 
regimes before accession (or in the case of stalled enlargement, without accession). 
Candidate states comply with EU law not because they are subject to a legal obligation 
under the EU Treaties, but because they are incentivised by what Tanja Börzel calls ‘the 
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shadow of hierarchy’.147 In the case of accession, this relates to the inequality of 
bargaining power between an individual candidate state and the EU, its institutions and 
its Member States, the latter wielding the ‘acquis communautaire’, compliance with 
which is a necessary condition for accession. This presents an interesting contrast to the 
imprint of the acquis in the context of withdrawal from the Union, even though a similar 
inequality of bargaining power between the withdrawing state and the EU has become 
visible during the Brexit negotiations. Escaping the acquis is no simple matter and, as 
we have seen, has both direct and indirect impacts upon citizenship regimes, which 
together illustrate the complex and ‘messy’ nature of the EU’s multilevel constitutional 
setup. From the perspective of accession, the acquis comprises not only the body of 
laws and policies that candidate states must have in place when they accede, but also the 
broader requirements related to the so-called Copenhagen criteria, in particular 
compliance with the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as progress 
towards a market economy.148 These criteria were solidified after 1989 precisely in 
order to deal with the challenges of transition in central, eastern and south eastern 
Europe. It is often in this latter domain, in the absence of specific competences at the 
EU level affecting most aspects of the acquisition and loss of citizenship, that the effect 
of complying with the acquis is felt most intensively by candidate states. It is here, 
given the arrested state-building processes of many of the new states of South East 
Europe,149 not to mention in the manifold problems of corruption in the emerging 
market places, that reluctant Member States can also find reasons to block or delay 
enlargement based on a fear that the EU at present has reached the limits of its so-called 
absorption capacity and ‘enlargement fatigue’ has set in.150 
 
However problematic stalled enlargement may be, it differs from Brexit as it does not 
involve the reliance or trust dynamic that is so prominent in the case of Brexit both for 
UK citizens in the EU27 and EU27 citizens in the UK. It is one of the ironies of Brexit 
that it appears to visit upon UK citizens and upon EU citizens resident in the UK the 
uncertainties and sense of exclusion that south east Europeans have long confronted in 
the context of the disintegration of states in the region and the failed promises of a 
‘European future’.151 But equally, there is nothing akin to the threat of a ‘no deal Brexit’ 
in the sphere of enlargement. Enlargement negotiations may stall, but they will not 
result in a sudden and potentially very damaging change of status. On the contrary, 
stagnation freezes the current status (and also in many respects the relationships 
between the various candidate states), and it is this which generates the conditions under 
which there is only limited Europeanisation of the citizenship regimes of the new states 
of south East Europe and under which a variety of individualised Europeanisation 
strategies are embarked upon by citizens in the region. 
 
A closer look at these citizenship regimes produces a similarly fragmented picture to 
that which we have seen in the case of the ongoing saga of Brexit. Changes within and 
across the citizenship regimes of the new states of South East Europe stem not just from 
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the candidate or putative candidate status of each of these states, but also from the 
exigencies of domestic politics as well as from a variety of other exogenous factors 
(including the role of international organisations other than the EU as well as the 
policies and laws of neighbouring states).152 
 
In the former Yugoslavia, the period after 1991 saw a period of re-nationalisation, both 
in the form of new states being established each with their own citizenship regime, but 
also in relation to the restrictions imposed on the citizens of those states. Of the 
European socialist states before 1989, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) had the closest relations with the then European Communities.153 It had 
benefitted from its break with the Soviet Union after 1948 to develop a unique 
decentralised market socialism model based on employee-managed firms which made it 
a more comfortable partner for the European Communities and the Member States than 
other socialist countries, albeit that it continued to display significant rule of law, 
democracy and human rights deficits. Its citizens enjoyed visa free travel across most of 
Europe, relying on the old red Yugoslav passport, at a point in time when visas 
remained solely a matter of national competence.154 Substantial numbers of guest 
workers from Yugoslavia lived, worked and settled in western European states 
including Germany, Austria and Sweden, and through naturalisation became themselves 
EU citizens after the Treaty of Maastricht came into force (and after the 1995 accession 
of the latter two states). The large groups of former Yugoslav citizens resident in 
Switzerland have enjoyed similar networks of economic and mobility rights across the 
EU under the bilateral arrangements governing Swiss/EU relations, once they (or more 
likely their children) have acquired Swiss citizenship. Transnational lives became 
commonplace for former Yugoslav citizens, whether they migrated before or after 
1991.155 Yet at the same time, especially in the 1980s, SFRY experienced intense 
challenges of its own particularly related to centre-periphery relations within an 
increasingly decentralised state. These troubles eventually contributed to the post-1989 
democratisation processes within Yugoslavia taking place at the level of the Republics, 
not at the federal level. By the end of the 1980s it was also facing huge economic 
problems related to international debt and the failure of its economic model. Centrifugal 
political forces, which included challenges around issues of citizenship and identity,156 
along with economic problems, not to mention the absence of a clear single view from 
the European Communities of twelve Member States all contributed to the eventual, 
complex, and sometimes violent break up processes. 
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The (national) citizenship governance challenges arising from the break-up of SFRY are 
many and varied and there is now an extensive literature documenting them.157 As the 
baseline for the majority of states when determining their initial citizenry was the rather 
neglected status of citizenship at the republican level within Yugoslavia, there 
inevitably remain many unsettled questions about citizenship, dual citizenship, external 
citizenship and national minorities within those new states.158 A dominant characteristic 
of the early citizenship regimes in the region was to posit the state, constitutionally 
speaking, as the ‘state of the titular majority’, rather than the ‘state of its citizens’.159 
Many people, especially ethnic minorities and those who had migrated within the 
former Yugoslavia, became refugees and displaced persons both within the region and 
beyond, although some of whom were able to return and reclaim citizenship and 
residence in the new state.160 This is what Igor Štiks has termed ‘ethnic engineering’ in 
relation to citizenship.161 Even so, Gëzim Krasniqi and Dejan Stjepanović reject the 
argument that ethnic politics somehow explains all the instances of what they call 
‘uneven citizenship’ across the region. When they use this descriptor, they are able to 
 
not only discuss exclusionary legal, political and social practices but also other 
unanticipated or unaccounted for results of citizenship policies that were based 
on specific criteria of membership. Sometimes…the criteria of membership and 
citizenship policies are conditioned by broader normative conceptions such as 
multicultural citizenship and differentiated citizenship and might not be ab initio 
defined as exclusionary, although the application of such criteria might lead to 
that outcome in practice.162 
 
Many examples show that ethnic politics is not the only factor when it comes to 
understanding outcomes. For example, issues of state authority and recognition (e.g., in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) continue to affect the quality of the citizenship 
status and rights.163 Plebiscites were held in circumstances where franchise definitions 
have been highly politicised (e.g., for Montenegro’s separation from Serbia).164 
Citizenship coverage is not comprehensive: there remain, for example, substantial 
numbers of stateless Roma, especially in Montenegro and Macedonia.165 There are 
frozen conflicts with citizenship dimensions within the region, for example between 
Kosovo and Serbia, or within Bosnia and Herzegovina as regards the secessionist claims 
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of the Republika Srpska. Bosnian citizenship itself is a complex multilevel network of 
rights, privileges and duties, determined by the flawed consociationalist Dayton 
Constitution imposed in order to end the fighting.166 This is just one example of major 
changes to national citizenship regimes introduced as a result of exogenous pressures.167 
Other examples of direct impacts of external actors on the national citizenship regimes 
can be seen in  the impact of the Ohrid Accords in Macedonia in relation to opening out 
citizenship acquisition by Macedonia’s Albanian minority168 and the fact that Kosovo’s 
first citizenship law was written into the Ahtisaari Plan for a Kosovo status 
settlement.169 The operation of these exogenous forces draws our attention back towards 
the question of the Europeanisation of citizenship in the new states of south East 
Europe, and especially the limitations that have resulted from the stalled enlargement 
process. Jelena Džankić and Soeren Keil argue that the process of Europeanisation in 
contested states encounters particular sensitivities around issues of sovereignty, to an 
extent that was not the case during previous enlargement rounds.170 
 
Right from the beginning of the post-Yugoslav story, exogenous forces have been 
present, but not always been enabling. For example, after 1991 many of the citizens of 
the new states no longer enjoyed freedom of travel, and in many cases these restrictions 
lasted until Schengen visa liberalisation at the end of the 2000s. Here we already have 
an example of de-Europeanisation by denial. As part of a pathway to accession, 
Schengen visa liberalisation was achieved in 2009 and 2010 for the citizens of all the 
states apart from Kosovo. To achieve this, those states were forced to follow a strict 
pathway of conditionality, involving extensive national legislative adjustments in areas 
such as non-discrimination law and immigration law, even though no pathway to 
accession has yet been made visible.171 Perhaps the starkest example was Serbia which 
was required to distinguish between different groups of citizens in order to seek to 
ensure that Kosovans (including Kosovan Serbs) were not included in the visa 
liberalisation.172 Kosovans, of course, still require visas just to visit other parts of what 
was once the same country, and until recently struggled even to gain access at all to the 
territory of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which do not recognise its existence. 
Meanwhile, the UK and Ireland – not part of the Schengen zone – continue to require 
that the citizens of all of the Western Balkan states obtain visas prior to travel. But 
Schengen visa liberalisation in turn has fostered flows of people and behaviours that 
some of the Member States have found to be problematic, such as overstaying the three 
months during which these groups are allowed to stay visa-free.173 The opportunity to 
move freely for the short term, but not to work or to settle, has highlighted economic 
inequalities between those states and the wealthier parts of the EU, as well as 
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pinpointing the effects of economic and social exclusion operating within those states, 
creating effective underclasses such as the Roma (as a transnational group) or 
Kosovans, who do not enjoy visa liberalisation and have the lowest per capita income in 
the region.174 In other words, it replicates the image of the Europe of many citizenships. 
 
At the same time, during 2015 and 2016, the so-called ‘Balkan route’ became a major 
corridor and entry point to the European Union / Schengen area and the Member States 
of persons seeking refuge from Syria, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and other states 
experiencing conflict of various kinds.175 This has led to an increased securitisation of 
the Schengen border in that region and an outsourcing of securitisation to non-Schengen 
states.176 Moreover, the continuing presence of large numbers of refugees on their 
territories has posed challenges to societies that themselves are struggling with 
economic growth, social cohesion, political stability and ineffective governmental 
institutions. 
 
In February 2018, there was a major relaunch of efforts to achieve enlargement, offering 
Serbia and Montenegro prospects for membership in 2025.177 It remains to be seen 
whether this process will lead to new progress towards enlargement for those two 
countries, or whether the name agreement between Greece and what is now the 
Republic of North Macedonia, which facilitated rapid NATO accession, will open up 
the route to EU membership.178 Despite the best efforts of those states holding the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers – notably Romania in the first part of 2019 
which has a clear regional interest in the issue – there is little sign that Western Balkan 
enlargement will become a priority for the Member States. It is clear that in comparison 
to the period 1992-2007, during which the institutionalisation of enlargement processes 
within the European Commission may have enhanced prospects for membership and for 
Europeanisation more generally (and especially for the benefit of the wider region of 
Central and Eastern Europe from which 11 countries acceded between 2004 and 2013), 
that the re-nationalisation of many aspects of the Western Balkans enlargement process 
has created a different dynamic.179 There is a significant gap between the rhetoric which 
recognises the Western Balkan countries as European, and thus their citizens as fellow 
Europeans, and the delivery of concrete steps towards enlargement. Not all of this can 
be attributed to the failings of the governments of the candidate countries. 
 
The denial of accession has an intense impact for two reasons: first, the denial of Union 
citizenship limits the life chances of the citizens of those states; and second, there are 
knock-on effects of stalled enlargement on national citizenship regimes as a result of the 
responses of individual citizens. Pre-accession agreements to facilitate travel through 
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visa liberalisation (or ‘roadmaps’ to visa liberalisation in the case of Kosovo) are not 
adequate substitutes for full free movement rights and the application of the non-
discrimination principle. Yet already, for any such advantages to be granted, accession 
states have to make substantial internal adjustments. Of course, Union citizenship does 
follow eventual accession, but extended transitional regimes and delayed access to 
labour markets and, especially, welfare regimes can render even this status contingent 
and partial, as Slovenians and Croatians in the region can attest.180 It is clear that denial 
of accession is at least partly about the denial of free movement and labour market 
access. Moreover, the legal texts governing accession and transition are often complex 
and require interpretation by the CJEU, rendering the law intransparent and 
inaccessible. Yet again, the image of the many citizenships of Europe comes to the fore. 
Elsewhere, the few incentives held out to the citizens of those prospective Member 
States to remain hopeful and optimistic are largely symbolic, such as the prospect of the 
abolition of roaming charges or the rollout of broadband across the region.181 
 
Pushed into the periphery and into a relationship of continuing dependency by the 
EU,182 the situation in the Balkans contributes to complicating any common notions of 
‘Europe’.183 These countries retain their historic status as borderlands, a situation 
reinforced by the character and events of the so-called migrant crisis, when the western 
Balkans became one of the most important routes for entry into the EU.184 Reactions to 
that route, and the work done to close it, gave more meaning than ever to the idea of 
‘Fortress Europe’, with much of the Balkans outside and subject to EU and national 
immigration laws. As a result, citizens in Western Balkan states have become 
increasingly disillusioned and disinterested, both in respect of their own state 
institutions, which are seen as ineffective185 and also in respect of the EU, its 
institutions and its Member States.186 Some have suggested that in Serbia, for example, 
Europeanisation has gone into reverse.187 Success stories such as the compromise 
reached between Greece and FYROM to rename the latter ‘North Macedonia’, with a 
view to freeing up NATO accession and eventual EU accession, are few and far 
between.188 Certainly Euroscepticism is on the rise, both in terms of the rise of parties 
trading in nationalist, Eurosceptic and ‘anti-Western’ ideas189 and in terms of a general 
weariness about the methods and approach of the EU and its Member States.190 
 
                                                 
180  P Dwyer et al, ‘The impact of conditionality on the welfare rights of EU migrants in the UK’, 
(2019) 47 Policy and Politics 133–50. 
181  ‘EU-Western Balkans summit: improving connectivity and security in the region’, European 
Commission Press Release, IP/18/3821, 17 May 2018. 
182  Baker, above n9. 
183  S Horvat and I Štiks (eds), Welcome to the desert of post-socialism radical politics after 
Yugoslavia (Verso Books, London, 2015). 
184  J Greenberg and I Spasić, ‘Beyond East and West: Solidarity politics and the absent/present 
State in the Balkans’, (2017) 76 Slavic Review 315-326. 
185  Greenberg and Spasić, above n184. 
186  On attitudes to EU membership and accession see the data collected on the Balkan Public 
Barometer: available at <https://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/balkan-opinion-barometer> and 
<https://www.rcc.int/seeds/results/2/balkan-opinion-barometer>. 
187  A Castaldo and A Pinna, ‘De-Europeanization in the Balkans. Media freedom in post-Milošević 
Serbia’, (2018) 19 European Politics and Society 264-281. 
188  See Fouéré above n178.  
189  M Stojić, Party Responses to the EU in the Western Balkans (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018). 
190  Belloni, above n22. 
 32 
One consequence of this situation has been an extensive deflection of those for whom 
this is possible into other citizenships, just as has been happening with the case of 
Brexit. Those with more than a single citizenship, or citizenship opportunity, have 
found ways to swerve some of the implications of stalled enlargement. As with Brexit, 
such a ‘compensatory citizenship’ can make up for the weakness, or perceived 
weakness, of the primary citizenship.191 
 
The routes followed are many and various, with opportunities often arising from the 
stance of the target state in relation to kin minorities in neighbouring states. Hungary 
has made it particularly easy for non-residents who can demonstrate Hungarian 
ethnicity to acquire citizenship, applying very few conditions. This has been attractive 
in the Serbian region of Vojvodina where there is a substantial Hungarian diaspora.192 
These actions have shored up the status of the governing party. The situation is similar 
for Bosnian Croats, who can easily access Croatian citizenship, as well as the right to 
vote in Croatia and Croatian welfare benefits.193 Macedonians may be able to access 
Bulgarian citizenship.194 Albanian citizenship is relatively easy for Kosovan citizens to 
obtain, not least because of continuing Albanian visions of a ‘greater Albania’ 
incorporating Kosovo. Kosovans (ethnic Albanians as well as ethnic Serbs) may also 
seek to acquire Serbian citizenship, despite Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and the 
obstacles that the EU has placed in the way of Kosovo domiciled Serbian citizens 
(including ethnic Serbs) from benefitting from visa liberalisation. Either way, for 
citizens of Europe’s most excluded state, these options may sometimes offer 
improvements in terms of freedom to travel. 
 
Finding a second citizenship within the region is often less about affinity or emotional 
attachment, and more about ‘trading up’. Where these target states are themselves EU 
Member States giving access to Union citizenship, this raises the same questions that 
the European Commission has been raising about preferential access to citizenship for 
investors, although in this case it is preferential citizenship for ethnic kin.195 If Member 
States maintain citizenship regimes which are open – whether to investors or to ethnic 
kin – they could well also be exploiting the attractiveness of Union citizenship to 
benefit themselves in some way. Moreover, it may have effects on the citizenship 
regime out of which the trade is made, in terms of hollowing it out, if very substantial 
numbers of citizens become dual citizens. It casts doubt, for example, upon exclusivity 
of allegiance to the state. This is particularly clear in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where it is only one ethnic group – the so-called Bosniaks – who cannot 
point to a co-ethnic ‘parent’ country. There may also be a distorting impact upon the 
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citizenship regime of the target state, although in some cases – as with Hungary – these 
effects may be sought by the government, if it considers that allocating citizenship and 
voting rights (without prior residence) to the ‘diaspora’ is liable to profit one particular 
political party and to enable it to hold on to power.196 Similar reflections would apply in 
the case of the openness of Croatia’s citizenship regime to ethnic Croats from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
 
In the Western Balkans it is rarely economic privilege alone that opens the doors to a 
second citizenship, but more often the happenstance of birth. The fact that these 
strategies are viewed as both acceptable and indeed desirable by many lends substance 
to Ayelet Shachar’s longstanding argument that one of the most important dimensions 
of distributive justice on a global scale remains the birthright citizenship allocation rules 
of states, which give rise to substantial and enduring structural inequality.197 Market 
access flows from having a Union citizenship, rather than just one from the Western 
Balkans and from this will in turn flow economic advantage. Combined with internal 
structures of exclusion, such as those which often restrict the access of the Roma to 
formal identity documentation, the happenstance of where you are born, and who your 
ancestors were, will then reinforce old and new vulnerabilities and vectors of privilege 
and inequality. It gives substance to the image of a region of many citizenships, and of 
uneven citizenship opportunities for different groups. 
 
For those who have already left the region for work or family reasons, or as refugees or 
displaced persons during the 1990s, there is unlikely to be much hesitation in seeking 
naturalisation once the conditions for this in the host state are satisfied. Figures show 
that Albanians were amongst the main recipients of Union citizenship in 2017, with 
Italy and Greece being the two countries where they are most likely to naturalise.198 
Serbia and Kosovo are also in the top 30 ‘receiving’ nationalities. Well-trodden routes 
also include those carrying Bosnian, Serbian and Kosovan migrants to Austrian 
citizenship, even though this will require the renunciation of their origin state 
citizenships because of Austria’s continued resistance to dual citizenship.199 It should be 
noted that most states across the region are open to dual citizenship, with the exception 
of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina (to a lesser extent).200 In fact, the practice 
of compensatory citizenship generally depends upon the widespread liberalisation of 
dual citizenship since the second world war. 
 
One important point that emerges from this story of stalled and perhaps failed 
enlargement is that the teleology of an ever wider and deeper Union with transformative 
effects – with consequential impacts upon citizens – is now in deep trouble.201 As a 
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process, Europeanisation in the Western Balkans has proved to be hesitant and 
ambiguous, and perhaps reversible. Holding out the possibility of EU membership has 
contributed to semi-Europeanised citizenship regimes in those states, but part of that 
Europeanisation process has been horizontal in character, as individual actions have 
contributed to a progressively closer entwining of different national citizenship regimes 
in constellations, both within the region and across its external boundaries. The ‘dual 
citizens’, of various kinds, find themselves often in a better position to access the 
benefits of EU free movement and Union citizenship. In that respect, we can see a 
Europe of many citizenships, and diverse types of (European) non-citizenship, as many 
of the ‘left behind’ citizens of the former Yugoslav states, and the formerly isolated 
Albania, struggle to overcome the heritage of their respective histories. 
 
VII Conclusions: (semi-)Europeanised citizenship in a loose and messy Union 
 
In this article, the transformation of citizenship regimes in the European constitutional 
space has been used as a test case through which to explore the processes of integration 
and disintegration or ‘troubled membership’ which are occurring across the north 
western and south eastern borders of the European Union. In this brief conclusion, I 
want to sum up the main findings and link the case studies of citizenship governance 
back to the broader questions of constitutionalism and constitutionalisation in the euro-
polity. There are pragmatic links between Brexit and stalled enlargement, as scholars 
have noted. Brexit risks diverting attention away from the issue of enlargement.202 But it 
is clear that the parallels go beyond such narrow points to reflect also the many faces of 
citizenship, as well a Europe of many citizenships. It is interesting to see the various 
dynamics between the EU institutions and the Member States in relation to the two 
cases. A striking degree of togetherness has been demonstrated by the EU27 in relation 
to Brexit. As Member States reassert control over enlargement, there has been a 
noticeable splintering of approaches, reflecting the divergent interests of the states. Yet 
in the area of Brexit it is clear that many of the citizenship-related dynamics are still 
inevitably controlled and dealt with by the Member States, and not by the EU 
institutions, because national citizenship is a creature of national law. 
 
If Brexit is a failure of the cosmopolitan vision,203 then there are parallels in the ‘failure 
of vision’ which relates also to the refusal of enlargement on the grounds that the 
Western Balkans are just too, well, ‘Balkan’ to be ‘proper’ members of the EU. 
‘Europeanness’ seems to be a very unstable concept.204 On both sides, there seem to be 
strongly racialised discourses in place.205 It might be tempting to point to ‘EU 
intransigence’ in both cases, and to claim that the citizenship consequences of Brexit 
and the denial of Union citizenship in the case of stalled enlargement are a result of the 
failure of the EU and its Member States to reform free movement and thus to make EU 
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membership more attractive for UK voters who fear immigration and more accessible to 
a set of countries from south east Europe, which are otherwise seen as triggers for 
excessive immigration if they are allowed into the club. There are fraught politics on 
both sides, although only in the case of Brexit has it become clear that there might be 
‘cliff edge’ problems for citizens in the event of both the threat and the actuality of a no 
deal Brexit. With the Western Balkans as a whole, just as with many of the conflicts 
within the region, so the relations between those states and the EU seem frozen and 
incapable of being moved forward. 
 
After Brexit, EU27 citizens now face the prospect of dealing with the UK’s so-called 
hostile environment for illegal immigrants and UK citizens face uncertain futures under 
27 different legal regimes. The movement of people across the boundaries of Union 
citizenship highlights the sharp distinction between the strong personal freedoms of 
‘free movement’ and the restrictions and discretionary measures of ‘immigration law’. 
‘Fortress Britain’ comes with costs, as it may also make UK citizens the subjects of 
Fortress Europe. These are the challenges already faced by those from the Western 
Balkans who try to travel or settle in the UK, but Brexit will bring some of these costs 
much closer to ‘home’, shaking up the established ‘citizenship constellations’ formed 
around the core of the UK’s EU membership over 40 years. 
 
Brexit and stalled enlargement help to show how Union citizenship remains a partial, 
differentiated and conditional status and yet it is also a potential pathway to greater 
personal and social freedom and a status which retains some promise of equality for the 
future. It is clear that the deflection strategies of individuals ‘escaping’ Brexit and 
stalled enlargement present Union citizenship as an attractive destination or stopping 
point. But at the same time, those strategies place question marks over the character of 
Union citizenship, if it is to be understood as an instrumental rather than a constitutional 
status. 
 
But beyond this, there may also be other paradoxical and complex effects which arise as 
a result of the collapse, neglect or denial, of Europeanisation in relation to the 
governance of citizenship across the fuzzy outer borders of the EU. These effects could 
see a set of common interests emerging across a range of actors, including citizens of 
excluded states, citizens of new Member States subject to transitional regimes, third 
country national family members of EU citizens and ‘static’ EU citizens, none of whom 
are feel fully valorised within the predominantly economistic conception of 
‘membership’ under EU law. Members of all of these groups may contest, for example, 
the model of equality being used to justify the current conception of Union citizenship, 
favouring as it does multiple over singular forms of membership. Some may welcome 
the disruptive forces of troubled membership, whilst fearing a potential loss of rights if 
legal changes are effected in a disorderly manner, or without regard to their interests. 
But others reject any departure from the status quo as creating first and foremost new 
and unwarranted insecurities. From this we can see that troubled membership may not 
so much be an anomaly thrown up by the sorts of challenges that have arisen in the 
north west or south east of the European continent, but rather an embedded feature of a 
multi-level architecture for citizenship governance, such as that observed in this article. 
 
At the outset of this article, we noted that membership of the European Union mandated 
the sharing of sovereignty in some areas amongst states, as well as the involvement of 
supranational institutions endowed with competences protected under the rule-based 
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system of the Treaties. This idea embodies a powerful and neat idea of supranational 
integration which is rarely completely reflected in practice. Recent years have seen not 
just the disruptive elements of Brexit and stalled enlargement, but also instances of 
democratic backsliding amongst the (continuing) Member States. In all of these cases, 
issues of (national) sovereignty have played a role, as the limits of the Union’s inchoate 
and often contested constitution come clearly into view. The ebbs and flows of 
Europeanisation across the EU citizenship regime, as well as those of the current, future 
and possibly withdrawing Member States, turn many of these ideas from theoretical 
commitment to principles such as the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights 
into live issues of inclusion and exclusion across the boundaries of the EU. 
 
 
